

**WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

JENNIFER CARTNAL, *Applicant*

vs.

**UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE;
permissibly self-insured, administered by SEDGWICK, *Defendants***

**Adjudication Number: ADJ10151267
Marina del Rey District Office**

**OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITION FOR
RECONSIDERATION**

Defendant seeks reconsideration of the October 23, 2024 Findings and Award issued by the workers' compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). Therein and as relevant here, the WCJ found that applicant sustained injury to her cervical and lumbar spine, left hand, head, ears and psyche and injury in the form of blackouts, while employed as an Associate Director of Transportation on May 18, 2015. The WCJ further found applicant is totally permanently disabled because of her injury on a psychiatric basis.

Defendant contends that the WCJ erred in finding that applicant sustained a brain injury resulting in total permanent disability and that applicant is not amenable to vocational retraining and is unable to compete in the labor force result of her psychiatric and cognitive dysfunction. Defendant further contends that applicant's vocational expert evidence is not substantial evidence.

Applicant filed an Answer. The WCJ issued a Report and Recommendation on Petition for Reconsideration recommending that we deny reconsideration.

We have considered the Petition for Reconsideration, the Answer, and the contents of the Report, and we have reviewed the record in this matter. Based upon our preliminary review of the record, we will grant defendant's Petition for Reconsideration. Our order granting the Petition for Reconsideration is not a final order, and we will order that a final decision after reconsideration is deferred pending further review of the merits of the Petition for Reconsideration and further consideration of the entire record in light of the applicable statutory and decisional law. Once a

final decision after reconsideration is issued by the Appeals Board, any aggrieved person may timely seek a writ of review pursuant to Labor Code section 5950 et seq.

I.

Preliminarily, we note that former Labor Code¹ section 5909 provided that a petition for reconsideration was deemed denied unless the Appeals Board acted on the petition within 60 days from the date of filing. (Lab. Code, § 5909.) Effective July 2, 2024, section 5909 was amended to state in relevant part that:

- (a) A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by the appeals board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from the date a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board.
- (b)
 - (1) When a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board, the trial judge shall provide notice to the parties of the case and the appeals board.
 - (2) For purposes of paragraph (1), service of the accompanying report, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 5900, shall constitute providing notice.

Under section 5909(a), the Appeals Board must act on a petition for reconsideration within 60 days of transmission of the case to the Appeals Board. Transmission is reflected in Events in the Electronic Adjudication Management System (EAMS). Specifically, in Case Events, under Event Description is the phrase “Sent to Recon” and under Additional Information is the phrase “The case is sent to the Recon board.”

Here, according to Events, the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on December 9, 2024, and 60 days from the date of transmission is February 7, 2025. This decision is issued by or on February 7, 2025, so that we have timely acted on the petition as required by section 5909(a).

Section 5909(b)(1) requires that the parties and the Appeals Board be provided with notice of transmission of the case. Transmission of the case to the Appeals Board in EAMS provides notice to the Appeals Board. Thus, the requirement in subdivision (1) ensures that the parties are notified of the accurate date for the commencement of the 60-day period for the Appeals Board to act on a petition. Labor Code section 5909(b)(2) provides that service of the Report and Recommendation shall be notice of transmission.

¹ All further statutory references are to the Labor Code, unless otherwise noted.

Here, according to the proof of service for the Report and Recommendation by the workers' compensation administrative law judge, the Report was served on December 9, 2024, and the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on December 9, 2024. Service of the Report and transmission of the case to the Appeals Board occurred on the same day. Thus, we conclude that the parties were provided with the notice of transmission required by section 5909(b)(1) because service of the Report in compliance with section 5909(b)(2) provided them with actual notice as to the commencement of the 60-day period on December 9, 2024.

II.

The WCJ provided the following factual background in the Report:

This matter involves an injury sustained by Applicant, Jennifer Carnal, (hereinafter Applicant) while employed by the Defendant, University of California Irvine (hereinafter Defendant) on May 18, 2015. She was employed as an Associate Director of Transportation when she was involved in a motor vehicle accident which resulted in industrial injuries to her cervical spine, lumbar spine and left hand pursuant to Dr. Smith's report of 8/28/2018, (Ex. EE). She also sustained an injury to her psyche on an industrial basis pursuant to Dr. Friedman's report of 7/23/2020, as reported by Paul Broadus's Vocational Report of 12/11/2023, (Ex. 1) and by Dr. Lissaur in his report of 2/14/2022, (Ex. EE). These body parts were accepted by the Defendant. Additionally, after trial the undersigned found that Applicant sustained an injury to her head, blackouts and her ears (pursuant to Dr. Furst's report of 7/7/2023, (Ex. BB)) and Dr. Nudleman's report dated 8/28/2018, as found in Paul Broadus's report (Ex. 1).

Per stipulation of the Parties, Applicant's earnings at the date of injury were \$2,051.80, per week, warranting indemnity rates of \$1,103.29, for temporary disability and \$290.00, for permanent disability. All periods of TD claimed through the stipulated permanent and stationary date per Dr. Nudleman, 8/11/2016, have been adequately compensated and Defendant has paid Permanent Disability benefits at the rate of \$290.00, from 8/10/2016 to 2/7/2018.

This matter proceeded to trial on July 2, 2024, and the case was submitted after the parties filed posttrial briefs on August 1, 2024. At trial, testimony of the Applicant was taken, and Exhibits were admitted into evidence. No other witnesses testified.

The undersigned issued an F&A and Opinion on Decision on October 23, 2024. Defendant filed a timely Petition for Reconsideration on November 17, 2024.

Applicant thereafter filed an Answer to Petition for Reconsideration on November 19, 2024....

(Report at p. 2.)

III.

We highlight the following legal principles that may be relevant to our review of this matter:

It is well established that decisions by the Appeals Board must be supported by substantial evidence. (Lab. Code, §§ 5903, 5952(d); *Lamb v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1974) 11 Cal.3d 274 [39 Cal. Comp. Cases 310]; *Garza, supra*; *LeVesque v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627 [35 Cal. Comp. Cases 16].) “The term ‘substantial evidence’ means evidence which, if true, has probative force on the issues. It is more than a mere scintilla, and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion ... It must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.” (*Braewood Convalescent Hosp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Bolton)* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 159, 164 [48 Cal.Comp.Cases 566], emphasis removed and citations omitted.) To constitute substantial evidence “... a medical opinion must be framed in terms of reasonable medical probability, it must not be speculative, it must be based on pertinent facts and on an adequate examination and history, and it must set forth reasoning in support of its conclusions.” (*Escobedo v. Marshalls* (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604, 621 (Appeals Board en banc).)

Based on our review, we are not persuaded that the record is properly developed. Where the medical evidence or opinion on an issue is incomplete, stale, and no longer germane, or is based on an inaccurate history, or speculation, it does not constitute substantial evidence. (*Place v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 372 [35 Cal.Comp.Cases 525]; *Escobedo v. Marshalls* (2005) 70 Cal.Comp.Cases 604, 621 (Appeals Board en banc).)

Here, it is unclear from our preliminary review that there is substantial medical evidence to support the WCJ’s decision. Taking into account the statutory time constraints for acting on the petition, and based upon our initial review of the record, we believe reconsideration must be granted to allow sufficient opportunity to further study the factual and legal issues in this case. We believe that this action is necessary to give us a complete understanding of the record and to enable us to issue a just and reasoned decision. Reconsideration is therefore granted for this purpose and for such further proceedings as we may hereafter determine to be appropriate.

IV.

In addition, under our broad grant of authority, our jurisdiction over this matter is continuing.

A grant of reconsideration has the effect of causing “the whole subject matter [to be] reopened for further consideration and determination” (*Great Western Power Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (Savercool)* (1923) 191 Cal.724, 729 [10 I.A.C. 322]) and of “[throwing] the entire record open for review.” (*State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Com. (George)* (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 201, 203 [19 Cal.Comp.Cases 98].) Thus, once reconsideration has been granted, the Appeals Board has the full power to make new and different findings on issues presented for determination at the trial level, even with respect to issues not raised in the petition for reconsideration before it. (See Lab. Code, §§ 5907, 5908, 5908.5; see also *Gonzales v. Industrial Acci. Com.* (1958) 50 Cal.2d 360, 364.) “[t]here is no provision in chapter 7, dealing with proceedings for reconsideration and judicial review, limiting the time within which the commission may make its decision on reconsideration, and in the absence of a statutory authority limitation none will be implied.”; see generally Lab. Code, § 5803 [“The WCAB has continuing jurisdiction over its orders, decisions, and awards. . . . At any time, upon notice and after an opportunity to be heard is given to the parties in interest, the appeals board may rescind, alter, or amend any order, decision, or award, good cause appearing therefor.”].)

“The WCAB . . . is a constitutional court; hence, its final decisions are given res judicata effect.” (*Azadigian v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 372, 374 [57 Cal.Comp.Cases 391; see *Dow Chemical Co. v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 483, 491 [32 Cal.Comp.Cases 431]; *Dakins v. Board of Pension Commissioners* (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 374, 381 [184 Cal.Rptr. 576]; *Solari v. Atlas-Universal Service, Inc.* (1963) 215 Cal.App.2d 587, 593 [30 Cal.Rptr. 407].) A “final” order has been defined as one that either “determines any substantive right or liability of those involved in the case” (*Rymer v. Hagler* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1171, 1180; *Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Pointer)* (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 528, 534-535 [45 Cal.Comp.Cases 410]; *Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Kramer)* (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 39, 45 [43 Cal.Comp.Cases 661]), or determines a “threshold” issue that is fundamental to the claim for benefits. Interlocutory procedural or evidentiary decisions, entered in the midst of the workers’ compensation proceedings, are not considered “final” orders. (*Maranian v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1070, 1075

[65 Cal.Comp.Cases 650].) [“interim orders, which do not decide a threshold issue, such as intermediate procedural or evidentiary decisions, are not ‘final’ ”]; *Rymer, supra*, at p. 1180 [“[t]he term [‘final’] does not include intermediate procedural orders or discovery orders”]; *Kramer, supra*, at p. 45 [“[t]he term [‘final’] does not include intermediate procedural orders”].)

Section 5901 states in relevant part that:

No cause of action arising out of any final order, decision or award made and filed by the appeals board or a workers’ compensation judge shall accrue in any court to any person until and unless the appeals board on its own motion sets aside the final order, decision, or award and removes the proceeding to itself or if the person files a petition for reconsideration, and the reconsideration is granted or denied. ...

Thus, this is not a final decision on the merits of the Petition for Reconsideration, and we will order that issuance of the final decision after reconsideration is deferred. Once a final decision is issued by the Appeals Board, any aggrieved person may timely seek a writ of review pursuant to Labor Code sections 5950 et seq.

V.

Accordingly, we grant defendant’s Petition for Reconsideration, and order that a final decision after reconsideration is deferred pending further review of the merits of the Petition for Reconsideration and further consideration of the entire record in light of the applicable statutory and decisional law. *While this matter is pending before the Appeals Board, we encourage the parties to participate in the Appeals Board’s voluntary mediation program. Inquiries as to the use of our mediation program can be addressed to WCABmediation@dir.ca.gov.*

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s Petition for Reconsideration is **GRANTED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a final decision after reconsideration is **DEFERRED** pending further review of the merits of the Petition for Reconsideration and further consideration of the entire record in light of the applicable statutory and decisional law.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

/s/ JOSÉ H. RAZO, COMMISSIONER

I CONCUR,

/s/ CRAIG SNELLINGS, COMMISSIONER

/s/ JOSEPH V. CAPURRO, COMMISSIONER



DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

FEBRUARY 7, 2025

SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.

**JENNIFER CARTNAL
GOLDSCHMID, SILVER & SPINDEL
LAW OFFICE OF JODIE P. FILKINS**

PAG/es

I certify that I affixed the official seal of
the Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board to this original decision on this date.
CS